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REVERSE REGULATORY ARBITRAGE:
AN AUCTION APPROACH TO
REGULATORY ASSIGNMENTS
M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung*

In the years before the Financial Crisis, banks got to
pick their regulators, engaging in a form of regulatory
arbitrage that we now know was a race to the bottom.
We propose to turn the tables on the banks by allowing
regulators, specifically, bank examiners, to choose the
banks they regulate. We call this “reverse regulatory
arbitrage,” and we think it can help improve regulatory
outcomes. Building on our prior work that proposes to
pay bank examiners for performance—by giving them
financial incentives to avoid bank failures—we argue
that bank supervisory assignments should be set
through an auction among examiners. Examiner bidding
would generate information about examiners’ skills, experience and preferences, as well as information about
each bank. Provided examiners bear the upside and
downside of their regulatory behavior, a bidding system
for regulatory assignments could improve the fit between examiners and the banks they supervise, thereby
enhancing regulatory efficiency.

* Professor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law
(toddh@uchicago.edu); and Howard Zhang Faculty Research
Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
(fredtung@bu.edu), respectively.

DRAFT AUGUST 2, 2012

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128823

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1
A. WHY FIAT? ....................................................................................................... 1
B. REVERSING REGULATORY ARBITRAGE ........................................................ 5

II. THE THEORY OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION ............... 13
A. MARKETS V. FIRMS ............................................................................... 14
B. MARKET-HIERARCHY HYBRIDS ...................................................... 20
C. RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN PRACTICE ........................................ 23
III. BIDDING FOR BANKS .............................................................. 26
A. NECESSARY CONDITION: SKIN IN THE GAME........................... 27
B. AUCTIONING OFF SUPERVISION RIGHTS .................................... 29
C. IMPROVED MATCHING ......................................................................... 33
1. Signaling Information and Skill ...............................................34
2. Countering Incumbent Bias ........................................................36
D. THE ROLE OF DISCRETION ............................................................... 37
1. Negotiated Procurement.................................................................38
2. Application to Examiner Assignment ..................................40
IV. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS ............................ 41
A. BIASES IN BIDDING AND BEYOND ................................................. 42
B. PERVERSE BIDDING MOTIVATIONS ............................................... 45
1. Bidding for the Revolving Door ................................................46
2. Bidding for Inside Information .................................................49
3. Bidding for Other Private Values ............................................50
4. Collusive Bidding ................................................................................51
C. EXAMINATION TEAM MICROSTRUCTURE .................................... 53
D. WHY IT HAS NOT HAPPENED YET ................................................. 54
E. THINKING BEYOND THE AGENCY ................................................... 55
V.

CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 57

DRAFT AUGUST 2, 2012

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128823

I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Why Fiat?

A scarce resource, like labor, may be allocated in
one of two ways: by the price mechanism or by fiat.
With the price mechanism, the resource flows via market transactions to where it is valued most highly. By
contrast, fiat allocation occurs through the command
of a person with authority within a hierarchy. All economic activities face this choice of resource allocation
mechanism, and all institutions—be they firms, families, or governments—deploy a mix of these approaches. For example, the head of a family may want the
grass cut. She has two basic choices: she can command that a family member cut the grass, or she can
put the work out to bid among family members or
landscaping companies. The choice will be determined
by the relative costs and benefits of each approach. It
is simple and cheap to direct a family member to do
the work, but it might be done better or more efficiently if put out to bid.
As the costs of using market transactions fall (or
rise) relative to the costs of fiat, the more (or less) work
will be allocated by the price mechanism instead of fiat. Continuing with the grass-cutting example, if the
costs of finding a landscaping service, evaluating the
quality of the service, and negotiating an attractive
price are lowered—say, because of the inception of an
online marketplace for matching grass cutters and
homeowners—then at the margin, families will be more
likely to use a market than the fiat approach.
The accepted practice across government is that
regulatory resources, such as investigators or prosecutors, are allocated by fiat by department or agency
heads. Bank examiners are assigned to particular
banks at the discretion of higher-level regulators in the
agency hierarchy. Higher-ups in the agency decide
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based on their judgment about things like skill, fit,
work ethic, knowledge, and expertise. They must address complicated tradeoffs, such as the risk of capture versus the benefits of experience from regulators
working with the same firms year after year. One
agency solution is to rotate regulators “periodically to
ensure that an objective and fresh supervisory perspective is maintained."1 But there are downsides to a
fixed rotation system: knowing when one’s stake in a
particular institution will end may provide opportunities to hide costs in future periods.2 In addition, the
assignment process for bank examiners is completely
opaque to outside observers. Although a great deal depends on the efficient deployment of regulatory resources, the public knows shockingly little about the
process.3
See, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Large Bank
Supervisory Handbook, available at
http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/22019/occcomptr_handbook_large_bank_superv.pdf . See also "At the OCC,
examiners in charge for each bank have contracts to cover a bank
for up to five years. After that, they are rotated to another bank or
assignment, which can mean a move to another city. We want to
keep them fresh and learning. It's a very healthy thing to do. It's
not always convenient for them."
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/10/2442855/financ
ial-crisis-lands-more-bank.html (quoting _______Brosnan, a longtime OCC official).
2 For an example of this problem in another context, see Amity Shales, “China’s Katrina Shows Post-Communism No Big
Easy,” BLOOMBERG, May 21, 2008 (“China intentionally rotates its
governors to ensure they don't build up personal machines. Perversely, that freed officials from living with the consequences of
shoddy construction. Soon after the ribbon is cut on the new
school, they move on to the next post.”).
3 Although there is no public disclosure concerning how
these decisions are made or what factors inform them, we assume
bank regulators—agencies like the Office of Comptroller of the
Currency and the Federal Reserve—allocate regulatory resources
based on assessments of fit, capability, and expertise, as well as
the bank-specific information held by examiners. While we do not
pooh-pooh the value of these judgments, considering alternative
1

(continued next page)
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We are unaware of any criticism of the fiat approach to regulatory resource deployment in the legal
literature or elsewhere.4 This is surprising given the
widespread existence of regulatory failures and the
well-known pathologies of bureaucracies, particularly
those relating to regulatory assignments. For example,
regulatory capture is a serious concern, and assignment schemes may have important consequences for
combating or exacerbating capture. Our auction approach may make capture more difficult than under
the current system of fiat assignment, where interest
groups need only target the individuals responsible for
assigning work in order to influence regulation. Under
our approach, or in any hypothetical labor market
within an agency, interest groups would have to influence all potential market participants.
More generally, the fiat approach is a one-sided
approach to a two-sided problem. Regulatory higherups have information about examiner fit and capability, but so do examiners. Insofar as the examiners
cannot convey information relevant to setting regulatory assignments, the matching of examiners to banks
fails to utilize all of the information available. This
problem affects all economic transactions, and auctions are a well-accepted mechanism for aggregating
and processing information, as well as generating effiassignment mechanisms may offer improvements in regulatory
efficiency. Moreover, the lack of transparency about the process
means other values, like managerial self interest, nepotism, political favoritism, and so on, may be just as likely to inform allocation decisions.
4 The post-Financial Crisis reform proposals of academics,
pundits, and legislators do not address regulatory assignment
mechanisms, despite the fact that examiners were aware of but
utterly failed to prevent enormous amounts of excessive risk in
the banking system. While factors other than examiner assignment methods were assigned undoubtedly played a large role in
the crisis, we believe that misallocation of regulatory resources is
a problem that must be addressed as well.
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cient competition by buyers and sellers of the product
or service in question.
Our goal is two fold. First, we attempt to fill this
gap in the literature by considering the costs and benefits of the current approach to regulatory resource
deployment. We develop a theory of regulatory resource allocation, pointing out the shortcomings of the
pure fiat approach, as well as potential strengths. In
light of recent regulatory failures, it is time to subject
current examiner assignment methods to rigorous
scrutiny.5
Second, by using bank regulation as a sustained
example, we propose a system of resource allocation
pursuant to which examiners would bid for work at a
particular bank. We argue that using price-based auctions to inform the assignment of bank examiners
would help reveal valuable information held within
agencies but not readily available to higher-ups making allocation decisions. Such as system would also
serve as a self-correcting mechanism for the risks of
the capture of individual examiners, as well as reveal
valuable information about bank risk to agency managers.
Our proposal takes a page from private sector
practices that muddy the classic Coasean firm-market
dichotomy.6 A number of firms, recognizing the inforGetting regulatory assignments right may be especially important in light of recent work on the problems inherent in the
current regulatory approach to banking. See M. Todd Henderson
& James Spindler, “Why Bank Regulation Failed . . . and Will
Continue to Fail,” Working Paper, on file with authors.
6
In his work on the nature of the firm, Ronald Coase distinguished firms from markets, defining firms as loci where hierarchical commands effect transactions. Outside of the firm, by contrast—i.e., in markets—transactions are characterized by voluntary exchange. Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” 4 Economica 386 (1937). Coase concluded that the firm’s boundary is
determined based on where the net benefits of the fiat approach
(such as simplicity) are outweighed by the net benefits of the price
approach (such as information generation). Coase’s work gener5

(continued next page)
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mation aggregation and matching potential of markets,
have incorporated market mechanisms into their organizational decision making. Markets within hierarchies have emerged, and preliminary research largely
confirms the promised benefits of the internal marketbased mechanisms.7 Internal prediction markets and
job markets have improved forecasting and resource
allocation within hierarchies. We propose bringing this
private-sector learning to the government.
B.

Reversing Regulatory Arbitrage

In the run-up to the Financial Crisis of 20072008, banking regulation failed. Government postmortem reports on bank failures demonstrate widespread regulatory failure.8 As we’ve show in prior work,
bank examiners routinely identified fundamental
weaknesses in banks many years before their collapse,
yet failed to act aggressively enough to forestall problems that eventually led to disaster.9 For example, examination reports identified overly aggressive home
mortgage origination practices at banks like Washington Mutual, but regulators failed to act because of the
profits banks were making.10
In Pay For Regulator Performance, we argued
that one cause of this failure was the way bank examiners are paid: low-powered incentives delinked from
ates a prediction that as the costs of market transactions fall
(rise) relative to the costs of fiat, more (less) work will be allocated
by the price mechanism, instead of fiat.
7 See infra Part II.B.__
8
We recognize there were many other types of failures that contributed to
the Financial Crisis, and we do not believe it was solely a government problem.
Our only claim is that regulatory failure contributed to the Crisis.
9 For a discussion of the post-mortem accounts of bank failures, see M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,” __ S. CAL. L. REV. __ (2012).
10 Notwithstanding specific instructions not to do just this.
See id at __.
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desired outcomes yield low effort and misdirected
work.11 In that paper, we recommend performance pay
for examiners in the form of phantom debt and equity
securities of the banks they regulate, as well as a special takeover bonus tied to the timing of the decision to
take over a failed bank.12 The idea is to link bank examiner compensation with desired social outcomes, so
as to directly reward good regulatory outcomes and deter bad ones.13
While beneficial for incentivizing better performance, incentive pay for examiners by itself cannot
overcome allocative inefficiencies from command-andcontrol assignments. Consider the well-known problem
of regulatory capture. Many bank examiners work intensely at one bank for long periods, and this can bias
them. Some examiners may have been tempted to
shade facts or forestall regulatory action because of a
desire to avoid conflict with people the examiner
knows well and works with on a daily basis. Some examiners may have been more interested in currying
favor with the banks they regulated in hopes of enhancing future employment opportunities than in pursuing the public interest in safe and sound banking. If
examiners bear the costs of regulatory laxity and these
costs outweigh the personal gains, then this problem
is reduced. But if pay and other work-related incentives are insufficient to overcome this problem, then

See id at __.
See id at __.
13 The “optimal” social outcome here is a complicated thing to
define in the abstract, but it involves the efficient amount of lending to the most desirable sectors of the economy. The efficient level of lending trades off the potential for increasing economic
growth by increasing the velocity of money in the economy with
the downside from losses caused by too much lending. See M.
Todd Henderson & James Spindler, “Why Bank Regulation Failed
. . . and Will Continue to Fail,” Working Paper (2012) (on file with
author).
11
12
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assignment issues become crucial.14 Even if forced to
bear the downside of lax regulation, every regulator
only operates with the limits of his or her knowledge,
expertise, and awareness of the costs and benefits of
various regulatory choices. An auction for regulatory
services brings the views and information of many
regulators to bear on the efficiency of regulatory assignments.
Capture is not the only potential problem. If
regulators are initially assigned based on favoritism,
nepotism, politics, or other considerations unrelated to
performance, even a well-designed incentive pay program may not improve the quality of bank supervision.15 If bank examiners are mismatched with the
banks they regulate, even well-intentioned, wellincentivized examiners may perform poorly. This problem could be addressed to some extent by changing
the incentives of those doing the assigning, but as discussed elsewhere, there may not be a reliable way to
do this.16 Moreover, an auction system can simply be
the other side of this two-sided problem. Because incentive pay structures will always be imperfect, the allocation issue is an important compliment to any payfor-performance program.
In this Paper, we argue that agencies should replace (or at least supplement) the fiat assignment approach to resource allocation with a price-based approach.17 Specifically, we propose an auction-based
approach in which examiners would bid for regulatory

In addition, if agency higher-ups have perfect information
about the risks of capture in every case and work rules do not
prohibit resource allocation, then the problem is reduced.
15 The problem is even more acute in the absence of an incentive pay scheme.
16 See Henderson & Tung, supra note __ at __.
17 An (imperfect) model is the current government procurement process, pursuant to which outside suppliers bid for government contracts.
14
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assignments at particular banks.18 If examiners are
forced to internalize the costs and benefits of their
regulatory decisions, a well-designed assignment auction would generate information about individual examiners’ relative competencies for supervising particular banks. Auctions elicit better information about the
most efficient allocation of regulatory resources than
fiat. Better information would enable better matches
between regulators and the regulated, as well as potentially lowering the costs of effective regulation.
Government agencies already use the price
mechanism for some allocation decisions. Numerous
agencies assign contracts to outside suppliers through
competitive bidding. Instead of a government bureaucrat simply commanding a lower-level bureaucrat (of
her choosing) to perform a given task, tasks are defined, put to bid, and assigned to the individual or entity best able to perform the task.19 While not without
its problems, this approach may also be fruitful in
making internal assignments, since the costs and benefits of work assignments are not fundamentally different from other types of resource allocation questions.
We recognize that supervisors making internal
work assignments may have better information about
the resources at hand than government procurement
officers have when awarding outside contracts. We
therefore do not propose that agencies make regulatory assignments available to any willing bidder,20 or
Technically, our proposal is a reverse auction, where sellers
of regulatory services (not buyers) compete for supervisory assignments. Bids decrease over time with a reverse auction, with
the lower bidder winning the auction.
19 By “best” we mean the examiner who can achieve the optimal level of bank activity and risk taking at the lowest regulatory
cost.
20 As we discuss below, see infra Part IV.E, the more optimal
the incentive compensation contract, the lower the costs of expanding the range of potential examiners beyond a particular
agency.
18
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even that the lowest bid would necessarily always
win,21 but simply that examiner assignments be based
at least in part on a bidding process designed to match
resources to their most efficient uses. Examiners may
have valuable information about how resources should
best be assigned that their bosses do not possess. An
auction may help reveal this information.
Just as prices in the economy aggregate and reveal information, so too can bidding for regulatory assignments. The prominent features of the price mechanism – transparency, comparison across providers,
and continuous updating – may also foster competition
among examiners. As a theoretical matter, competition
for the provision of regulatory resources should be as
effective and efficient as for the provision of any other
resource, all else being equal. Admittedly, if social
costs of behavior are not captured in the prices paid
for regulation, then competition may not be welfare
maximizing; this is the infamous race to the bottom.
Accordingly, a crucial prerequisite to our proposed allocation model is that regulators reap some of the
gains and bear some of the losses from the quality of
their work.22 If this condition obtains, as our examiner
pay for performance proposal would accomplish, then
bidding for assignments would reveal valuable information that examiners possess but would otherwise be
unable or unwilling to provide.
To assure open and competitive bidding for contracts, government procurement relies on two different approaches, depending on the circumstances: sealed bidding and competitive negotiation. See Federal Acquisition Regulation, available at
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/index.html. While sealed bidding relies only on price and price-related factors in awarding
contracts, competitive negotiation is appropriate when it may be
necessary for contracting officers to conduct discussions with offerors. See FAR 6.401(a). Non-cost factors may also play a role in
determining which bid to accept. See id.
22 See Henderson & Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,”
supra note __ at ___.
21
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For instance, suppose Examiner 1 currently supervises activities at National Bank, but Examiner 2
believes that she is better able to bear the potential
downside risk in compensation from a regulatory failure at National Bank or is better able to assess the
risk at National Bank. There may be many reasons for
this. Examiner 2 may have greater skill than Examiner
1, but may not be able to readily convey this to those
making regulatory assignments. (Such an outcome
may be especially likely in the case where assignments
are made based on non-performance-related factors,
such as seniority.) Or Examiner 1 may be captured,
and therefore unwilling to act as aggressively as she
should.23 Or Examiner 2 may have better information
about the risk posed by the activities of National Bank.
In any of these situations, Examiner 2 may be able to
outbid Examiner 1 for the assignment, since Examiner
2 would be able to better value the costs and benefits
of the assignment. Examiner 2’s low bid for the assignment reveals valuable information about the relative fit between the work to be done and Examiner 1
versus Examiner 2.24
In addition, the bidding may reveal private information held by the examiners as a group about the
riskiness of particular banks. If individual risk aversion and individual examiner quality are relatively
For example, if Examiner 1 wears rose-colored glasses
about the risk of National Bank, she would underestimate the
risk posed by the bank, and therefore, in the auction model we
propose below, if Examiner 2 has a more realistic estimate of the
risk, she would be able to outbid Examiner 1 for the work.
24 As noted above, this model of assignment only works if Examiner 2 gains or loses depending on her ability to deliver the optimal amount of regulation. For instance, if Examiner 2 stands to
lose if National Bank engages in too much risk taking, then Examiner 2 has incentives to bake these losses into the price she is
willing to pay to examine National Bank. If not, that is, if Examiner 2 is able to capture gains from winning the work but put the
downside onto others, then her bid would not contain valuable
information about her ability to achieve the social optimum.
23
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constant through a bidding “season,” comparing the
sets of bids for each bank should reflect a rough estimate of the potential downside risk of taking on the
work at the various banks. Since examiners may have
good information about bank riskiness but imperfect
mechanisms for conveying this information to higherups in the regulatory agency, such a system may have
the virtue of surfacing the information in more efficient
ways.25
One way of conceptualizing our proposal is what
we call “reverse regulatory arbitrage,” that is, an antidote of sorts to the possibility that banks might encourage lax regulation through regulatory arbitrage.
Regulatory competition in banking is not new. For
many years leading up to the Financial Crisis, and
even today, banks effectively choose their regulator
when they decide where to obtain a banking charter.26
Regulators in turn had an incentive to design their
regulatory environments with an eye to attracting
banks in order expand the scope of their regulatory
authority.27 This competition among regulators offered
opportunities for banks to match their activities to the
most suitably lenient regulator, thereby minimizing the

25 There are other ways of transmitting this information. Examiners could do it informally simply by communicating their
views about the health of various banks throughout the agency.
The incentives to do so may be absent some incentive, be it financial or otherwise. In fact, such behavior may be discouraged precisely because of the lack of a formal allocation system, since it
may be viewed as undermining of other examiners. Alternatively,
examiners could be permitted to trade in bank securities. This
proposal suffers from numerous significant concerns, however,
including legal ones having to do with insider trading and practical ones having to do with the fact that anonymous purchases or
sales in the volumes examiners would trade are unlikely to move
market prices. An internal auction system avoids these problems.
26 See, e.g., John A. Weinberg, Competition Among Bank Regulators, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. QUART. 19 (2002).
27 See id.
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regulatory constraints on their business models.28
Regulation was unsuccessful in forcing banks to fully
internalize the downside of their risk taking, which
suggests that this competition was a race to the bottom for regulatory oversight.29 (One reason the race
among regulators was to the bottom instead of the top
is because regulatory agencies did not internalize the
full costs of their regulatory choices.)
Our proposal seeks to turn the tables on the
banks. Instead of permitting banks to choose their
regulators, we propose to let examiners choose their
banks.30 Examiners would compete for the banks they
wish to supervise, and they would do so through the
price mechanism. Essentially, we would auction off the
supervisory rights over individual banks, so that
banks would be matched with examiners who could
maximize banks’ regulatory value, thereby optimizing
regulatory resource allocation. Assuming regulators
would bear the downside of their own regulatory laxity
and the upside of their regulatory efficiency—through
an incentive pay scheme we have described elsewhere,
for example—this race would be toward the top and
not the bottom.
To make our core argument, we proceed as follows. In Part II, we describe the basic theory of resource allocation. We show how the price mechanism
is an alternative to command-and-control in the area
of regulatory resource deployment, and argue that the
benefits of using this method may exceed the costs in
a range of contexts. Part III then applies this thinking
to the case of bank examiners. In this part, we propose
See, e.g., Chana Joffe-Walt, “Regulating AIG: Who Fell
Asleep On the Job?,” NPR, June 5, 2009, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1049795
46.
29 See id.
30 So our focus is not on competition among regulatory agencies. Instead, we propose competition among examiners within a
given agency.
28
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a price-based auction for use in assigning bank regulators to supervisor specific banks. Part IV raises and
answers some potential objections, such as the revolving door problem and issues about manipulation.
II. THE THEORY OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Our proposal is well grounded in both theory
and practice outside of the regulatory context. Over
seventy years ago, Ronald Coase explained why resources are sometimes allocated by fiat—typically
within a firm hierarchy—and sometimes allocated
through the price mechanism—typically through market transactions.31 Market pricing coordinates economic interaction by revealing private information, but
fiat is the more efficient mechanism when the transaction costs of using prices are sufficiently large.32 For
instance, photocopying tasks for a business could perhaps be performed most efficiently if assigned through
competitive bidding (either inside or outside the firm),
but the costs of such an assignment system would
likely swamp any gains from improved performance of
the task.33
In this Part, we present the basic theory of resource allocation, as it applies to regulatory resources.
We first contrast prototypical markets with hierarchies
as mechanisms for resource allocation. We then describe the recent organizational innovation of internal
market-hybrid arrangements. Firms have recently begun to experiment with customized internal market
mechanisms in order to marshal markets’ informational and matching advantages for organizational deSee Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” supra note __ at ___.
See id. Coase defined a “firm” as the locus of decisions in
which this latter condition obtained.
33 The growth of the photocopying industry outside of firms,
as seen in firms like Kinkos, demonstrates that for certain assignments, the market for photocopies may be a valuable source
of efficiency.
31
32
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cision making. This hybrid approach best characterizes our auction proposal for examiner assignments. We
then explain how regulatory resources are allocated in
practice.
A.

Markets v. Firms

Every organization, be it a country, a firm, a
family, or an administrative agency, has to decide how
to allocate its resources to achieve its goals. For human capital allocation, the choice might involve who
will cut the grass, manage a new factory, or regulate a
particular bank. Whether the task is large or small,
complex or mundane, important or trivial, a decision
must be made about who will perform the task and
how she will do it.
Market allocations are made using the price
mechanism. Buyers and sellers are matched at mutually beneficial terms by reducing their preferences to a
single price at which they are willing to buy or sell.
Although probably not common, it is not difficult to
imagine families auctioning off chore assignments.
More commonly, consider a business deciding which
law firm should defend it in a lawsuit. The company
would solicit “bids” from various firms – that is, the
prices at which the firms would perform the work –
and, based on price and other factors, choose a counsel.34 The company could open the bidding up to both
internal and external lawyers.
Fiat, on the other hand, works based on hierarchy.35 Those higher up in a hierarchy make decisions
about who will do what. In the family example, the
head of the family simply chooses who will cut the
34 As the law firm example suggests, such market transactions may involve negotiated agreements, in addition to the traditional continuous double-blind auctions of spot markets.
35 The hierarchy could be created in a number of ways—by
contract, custom, or social norms, for example.
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grass, presumably backed up by sanctions for noncompliance, like grounding or withholding of an allowance. This is the way chores are typically allocated,
and thus familial resources deployed.36 Businesses
typically use this approach for marshalling their employees to work, and some countries have even used
this approach to allocate all resources within an economy. In the lawsuit example, the CEO could simply
command the general counsel to represent the company in the litigation.
As Coase noted,37 markets and hierarchies each
have their costs and benefits, and we should expect
the pattern of organizations’ choices to reflect the net
of these. When the costs of using the price mechanism
exceed the benefits, we see allocations made through
command-and-control structures, and vice versa.38 For
As explored below, however, fiat-based decisions necessarily
involve estimates of the costs and benefits of particular work assignments, and, knowing this, potential assignees will want to try
to influence the decision by signaling something about their efficiency at doing the work. For instance, a family member who really dislikes grass cutting may complain or do a terrible job, thus
trying to convey their “price” to the decision maker.
37 Coase defines a “firm” where the locus of command and
control stops and allocation via the price mechanism starts. See
Coase, “Nature of the Firm,” supra note __ at __. In Coase’s account, if a family or firm puts out the grass-cutting work to bid,
the winner of the bid, say a local landscaping business, is outside
the family or firm. See id. For instance, Apple Computer has other
companies bid for the work assembling Apple’s products, rather
than vertically integrating this work within Apple’s commandand-control hierarchy. Decisions about who will work on the design of the latest Apple phone, however, are made by managers
based on their assessment of capability, fit, interest, politics, and
so on.
38 Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which
is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the
market. Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated
and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who
directs production.
36

DRAFT AUGUST 2, 2012

16

HENDERSON AND TUNG

instance, if we observe that a business sources its
photocopying tasks internally by fiat but sources the
supply of copy paper by price, we can fairly assume
that the potential efficiency gains from using a market
mechanism are worth the cost in the latter case but
not in the former.39
Markets offer high-powered incentives for actors
to get their allocation decisions right. Competition
among buyers or sellers offers the potential for rich
rewards to skill and skill acquisition, innovation, hard
work, and information acquisition. Conversely, lack of
success in the competition can lead to lost business
and customers. The potentially rich rewards also attract new entrants, drawing talent to areas of market
need.40 Markets also encourage individuals to produce
and reveal information that might otherwise be difficult to obtain. Thomas Sowell summarizes nicely how
the price mechanism can efficiently aggregate, process,
and reveal valuable information held by all individuals—what F.A. Hayek called “tacit knowledge.”41 Sowell
writes:

39 Coase’s insight was to predict that the boundary of institutions, like business firms, would change over time to reflect the
relative costs and benefits of fiat versus command and control. In
times, industries, or situations in which hierarchy is more efficient than price, businesses or governments or agencies will expand to conduct more activity internally. When markets are more
efficient, by contrast, organizations will contract the scope of their
internal activities and increase their reliance on external markets.
[cite] The secular trend seems to be in the direction of the use of
more market mechanisms for allocating resources. Outsourcing,
whether it is of janitorial services, manufacturing, legal services,
or any other functions historically performed within the boundaries of a firm, is the most familiar modern example of Coase’s insight and this trend.
40 Todd. R. Zenger, Teppo Felin & Lyda Bigelow, Theories of
the Firm-Market Boundary, 5 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 89, 96 (2011).
41 See F. A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT (1988).
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Knowledge is one of the scarcest of all resources and a pricing system economizes
on its use by forcing those with the most
knowledge of their own particular situation to make bids for goods and resources
based on that knowledge, rather than on
their ability to influence other people in
planning commissions, legislatures, or
royal palaces.42
Related to information revelation and aggregation, markets facilitate matching and sorting. Especially in labor markets, which are populated with heterogeneous buyers and sellers, matching is an important
market function. “The broadcasting of information in
markets provides an opportunity to make valuable
comparisons across a set of alternatives, prices and
possibilities, and then make matches accordingly.”43
Managers or other purchasers of complex services issue requests for proposals, while service providers bid
for projects based not only on price but also on the basis of their heterogeneous skill sets, experience, reputations, and so on.
Markets may not always work well, however.
Market mechanisms require accurate prices, and price
discovery is a potentially costly exercise.44 The price
mechanism might also require extensive contracting.
Especially in labor markets, if projects are complex,
long lasting, and require specialized skills, the transaction costs of negotiating and writing these contracts
may be prohibitive. In addition, some actors may pre42

THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS (2007) (emphasis sup-

plied).
43 Teppo Felin & Todd R. Zenger, Information Aggregation,
Matching and Radical Market-Hierarchy Hybrids: Implications for
the Theory of the Firm, 9 STRATEGIC ORGANIZATION 163, 167 (2011).
44 Most static economic models assume all individuals know
all prices, but this is not a realistic assumption when considering
costs of setting up a market.
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fer long-term contracts for reasons beyond the costs of
contracting (e.g., risk allocation), and writing multiple
contracts over time may not deliver those benefits.
There may also be tax or regulatory provisions that
make a single fiat decision superior to multiple pricebased contracts.45
Assignment by fiat, by contrast, has low transactions costs once a firm’s hierarchy is built. At that
point, the choice about who should perform a task can
be as simple as choosing. Defining a task, putting it
out to bid, evaluating bids, and then engaging in extensive contracting are not required, as they are in
markets. To be sure, decision makers deploying a
command-and-control process may invest in information about the optimal resource allocation, but decisions can be made quickly and simply. Especially
when there may be few people capable of doing the
work, the stakes are low, the decider has good information about the expected quality of the work, monitoring is easy, and/or incentives for good work are
strong, assignment by fiat may be superior to market
transactions.
On the other hand, when one or more of these
conditions do not hold, market pricing may be more
efficient at matching workers with particular tasks
they can do well or risks they can bear well. With allocation by fiat, employees incur influence costs, hoping
to win a particular assignment by winning over the
boss with nonprice signals, like jawboning, making
friends, persuasion, or the like. More generally, fiatbased decisions are less transparent than price-based
decisions. Such decisions and their consequences may
therefore enjoy less legitimacy both within and outside
an organization. If a manager chooses A over B for an
45 For instance, sales and other transaction taxes apply to
some transactions considered outside of the firm, while certain
employment rules apply to some transactions considered inside of
the firm.
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assignment in a non-market environment, B may believe that A was chosen for reasons other than efficiency, such as nepotism, bias (e.g., race, gender, class, or
politics), favoritism, and so on. Whether true or not,
this may undermine the legitimacy of other managerial
decisions and may reduce the productivity of both A
and B, as well as other workers.46 With market allocation, workers can simply put their money where their
mouth is to reveal their private information about the
costs of their doing the work. So long as wealth constraints do not exist (something discussed more below), the price mechanism is unbiased. It also facilitates straightforward comparison. If designed properly,
price allocation reflects the social value of the work rather than private values that decision makers maximize by using nonprice allocation criteria.
Fiat has other drawbacks as well. There are diminishing marginal returns of management efficiency.
As the size of an organization and its activity levels increase, the transaction costs of fiat-based resource allocations rise. Information demands grow, as does the
expertise required of decision makers. Authorities require information about both projects and all potential
workers, and as the quantum of required information
aggregates across a larger and larger organization,
costs can rise exponentially. As Coase explained, at
some point, the inefficiencies from resource allocation
by fiat can be expected to equal (and then exceed) the
transaction costs of using the price mechanism. At
that point, we would expect to see greater resort to the
price mechanism and market allocation.

46 Similarly, in the case of a regulatory agency, without an objective metric for allocating regulatory resources, outside stakeholders—members of Congress or the general public, for example—may view the outcomes of the regulatory process as less legitimate.
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B.

Market-Hierarchy Hybrids

Markets and firms merely delineate the polar
cases in the spectrum of choices available to those responsible for allocating scarce resources, and Coase’s
dichotomous view of markets versus firms has broken
down in the face of organizational innovation. We observe efforts to design “internal hybrid” market mechanisms in order to reap the benefits that Coase described for markets generally, but based within hierarchical structures. Following on the success of public
information markets at predicting event outcomes,
firms have created highly specialized internal markets
to elicit and aggregate information from employees,
both to improve internal forecasting and decisionmaking and to allocate resources.
The most famous set of prediction markets is the
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), which offers the opportunity to essentially bet on the outcomes of U.S. Presidential and Congressional elections, as well as a host
of other issues of wide public interest.47 IEM election
markets are set up as futures markets, trading contracts whose payoffs depend on the outcome of future
events. The original IEM election market, set up in
1988, focused on the Bush-Dukakis Presidential race,
trading contracts that would pay 2-1/2 cents for each
percentage point of the popular vote ultimately obtained by a given candidate in the general election.48
Fluctuating trading prices for Bush or Dukakis contracts would therefore reflect popular sentiment about
the election’s outcome.
Other IEM markets include the Federal Reserve Monetary
Policy Market and the 2012 Republican Nomination Market. See
Iowa Electronic Markets, available at
http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/index.cfm (last visited June 8,
2012).
48 Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP., 107, 110 (2004).
47
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Prediction markets like IEM have bested expert
opinion in their predictive accuracy in a variety of contexts, including elections,49 the performance of Hollywood films (both in awards and box office receipts),50
and the winners of NFL games.51 These successes encouraged private companies to construct their own internal prediction markets. Hewlett-Packard, an early
adopter, found that employees trading in their internal
prediction market generated more accurate forecasts
of printer sales than the firm’s bureaucracy.52 Google
runs dozens of internal markets to forecast product
demand, internal performance, and industry events.53
In addition to predicting events, firms use internal markets to allocate resources, including labor.
See id. See also Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, and Forrest
Nelson, “Results from a Dozen years of election Futures Markets
Research,” in Handbook of Experimental Economic Results.
Charles Plott and Vernon Smith, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier; Joyce
Berg, Forrest Nelson, and Thomas Rietz, 2006. “Accuracy and
Forecast StandardError in Prediction Markets,” mimeo, University
of Iowa; Joyce Berg and Thomas Rietz, “The Iowa Electronic Market: Lessons Learned and Answers Yearned,” in Information Markets: A New Way of Making Decisions in the Public and Private
Sectors, ed. Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock, AEIBrookings Joint
Center, Washington D.C. (2006).
50 David Pennock, Steve Lawrence, Finnrup Nielsen and C.
Lee Giles, “Extracting Collective Probabilitistic Forecasts from
Web Games,” in Proceedings of the Seventh ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
174-183 (2001).
51 Emile Servan-Schreiber, Justin Wolfers, David Pennock and
Brian Galebach, “Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?” Electronic Markets, 14(3), 243-251 (2004).
52 Kay-Yut Chen and Charles Plott, “Information Aggregation
Mechanisms:Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales
Forecasting Problem,” CalTech (2002).
53 Cowgill, Wolfers & Zitzewitz_Google at 6 & tbl. 1. Google also runs “fun” markets, focusing on topics with no direct relation
to its business but which might be interesting or entertaining for
its employees—e.g., gas prices or the quality of Stars Wars Episode III). These fun markets may improve liquidity in the business-related markets. Id.
49
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British Petroleum has used internal electronic trading
to allocate carbon dioxide emission permits among
business units.54 Intel has experimented with internal
markets to allocate manufacturing capacity, allowing
plant managers, sales representatives and other employees to trade futures contracts for specific products.55 Hewlett-Packard has experimented with informal internal markets for assigning workers to projects.56 Researchers have also modeled internal allocation markets, identifying design features important to
their success.57
“[I]nternal hybrids are fundamentally attempts
to mimic, inside the hierarchy, the decentralization of
decision and income rights that characterize the market in an attempt to improve the efficiency of processes
of discovering, creating, and using knowledge.”58 As
Coase noted, markets offer high-powered incentives to
gather information and use it efficiently. Within conventional hierarchies, by contrast, information and decision making authority might not always be found in
the same place. Lower-level employees typically hold
specialized knowledge about their work environment
that higher-ups have no way of accessing. Internal
markets can help merge that knowledge with decision

Thomas W. Malone, Bringing the Market Inside, HARV. BUS.
REV. 107 (Apr. 2004).
55 Id. at 110; David McAdams & Thomas W. Malone, Internal
Markets for Supply Chain Capacity Allocation 6 (MIT Sloan Working Paper 2005).
56 Malone, supra note 54, at 109.
57 Stanley Baiman, Paul Fischer, Madhav V. Rajan & Richard
Saouma, Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms, 45 J. ACCTG.
RSC. 915 (2007); McAdams & Malone, supra note 55; James B.
Bushnell & Shmuel S. Oren, Internal Auctions for the Efficient
Sourcing of Intermediate Products, 12 J. OPER. MGMT. 311 (1995).
58 Nicolai J. Foss, Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids:
Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon
Spaghetti Organization, 14 ORG. SCI. 331, 336 (May-June 2003).
54
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rights, as well as offering high-powered incentives to
induce efficient use of that knowledge.59
Our auction proposal does just that. It serves to
collocate information and decision rights by delegating
authority to lower-level employees. In our case, bank
examiners enjoy authority to influence their work assignments through their auction bids. In addition, the
high-powered incentives that come with bank debtequity portfolios assure that examiners would make
efficient use of these decision rights. This complementarity between new high-powered incentives and newly
assigned decision rights for examiners may result in a
more efficient allocation of human capital.60
Before we turn to our specific proposal for auctioning examiner assignments, it is worth considering
how bank examiners and other regulatory resources
are currently deployed.
C.

Resource Allocation in Practice

Bank examiners are assigned to supervise particular banks through the dictate of their superiors in
the regulatory hierarchy,61 based on supervisors’
judgment about things like skill, fit, work ethic,
knowledge, and expertise. There is much to be said for
such discretionary, non-price-based determinations.
Allocators may have good information about optimal
allocation decisions given their personal knowledge
For a general discussion of potential applications of prediction markets in law, see Michael Abramowitz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 N.D. LAW
REV. 1343 (2007).
60 See id. at 337 (discussing the importance of organizational
complementarities).
61 For example, at the Office of Comptroller of the Currency,
“examiners in charge for each bank have contracts for up to five
years,” and assignments are made by fiat. See, e.g.,
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/10/2442855/financ
ial-crisis-lands-more-bank.html
59
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and experience, be it individual or institutional. Moreover, if examiners do not bear the costs of their socially suboptimal decisions, then putting more power in
their hands to decide their work makes little sense.62 A
hierarchical system also may have clear lines of authority, which make decisions simple and accountability for mistakes (theoretically) clear.
But this depends entirely on the incentives of
deciders and the quality and cost of their information.
For example, when making assignments, agency heads
must address complicated tradeoffs, such as the risk
of capture versus experience benefits from regulators
working with the same banks year after year. Though
periodic rotation of examiners helps maintain objectivity and fresh eyes,63 this benefit must be weighed
against the costs of forced rotation, which include the
loss of information and expertise, transition costs for
examiners,64 and the potential for any rule to be overor under-inclusive. The optimal rotation schedule may
be difficult to discern, which takes us back to the incentives of deciders. The public has almost no information about these incentives, about how the tradeoffs
are managed, and about the initial allocation decisions. Our proposal attempts to optimize the tradeoff
with more information, continuously, and at a bankand examiner-specific level.
More generally, next to nothing is known about
how the federal government’s vast resources are deployed. Despite this dearth of information, there are
good reasons to believe that resources may be allocated in inefficient ways. For instance, like nearly all fedFor instance, it would be inadvisable to allow examiners to
pick the banks they regulate if examiners choose banks based on
future employment prospects with those banks. Banks might, for
example, offer post-government jobs in exchange for lax oversight.
63 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
64
It's
not
always
convenient
for
them."http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/10/2442855/fina
ncial-crisis-lands-more-bank.html
62
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eral employees, bank regulators are paid almost exclusively with cash salaries and cannot routinely be fired.
In addition, the revolving-door problem and regulatory
capture are well known problems, and there is abundant evidence, both recent and historical, of regulatory
failure. All of this gives reason to worry about the efficacy of resource deployment.
There is also little oversight. Administrative
agencies publish budgets and some self-serving summaries of actions taken, but little else. To take just one
example, during the height of the recent finance bubble, bank regulatory agencies paid over $20 million in
cash bonuses to bank examiners, but we know nothing about the individual recipients, the metrics used to
allocate the bonuses, or anything else about how examiners were assigned to banks.65 Regulatory resources may be allocated in ways that are not necessarily aligned with social welfare, but we have no way
of knowing.
As we discuss in the next Part, things may
change if we modify the compensation scheme so that
examiners bear economic consequences from their decision making. Paying examiners with the debt and
equity of the banks they regulate gives examiners a
stake in their own performance, causing a shift in the
costs and benefits of using prices to allocate regulatory
resources. Costs are reduced because examiners now
have stronger incentives to accurately and judiciously
bid for their supervisory assignments, given the effect
of assignment on their personal wealth. At the very
least, such a system would vastly increase the transparency of the regulatory resource allocation process,
and this may alone be worth the costs of such a system.

65 See, Henderson & Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,”
supra note __ at __.
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III. BIDDING FOR BANKS
In this Part, we describe what an assignment
auction might look like. As implied by our earlier discussion of internal market hybrids,66 we do not propose the auction system as a complete replacement for
the current mechanism of resource allocation. Instead,
we view it as a crucial allocative mechanism within an
organizational framework of fiat decisionmaking, in the
same way that specialized internal markets within private firms are used to allocate resources and improve
decisionmaking. Prices offer valuable information that
can complement nonprice mechanisms. At the same
time, nonprice factors may matter, and errors or biases may mar the auction process. For example, agency
heads may rightly be concerned about the winner’s
curse or optimism bias on the part of examiners. Or
certain examiners might harbor perverse bidding incentives.67 Internal markets, like other markets, may
require market regulators.68 Agency heads may therefore wish to retain some amount of discretion to consider nonprice factors as well as bidding outcomes, an
arrangement that is a common feature of the bidding
process for both government and private contracts.
More generally, the structural details of any
price-based system will be crucial to its success, and
agency heads and other experts are far better positioned to design and implement the system than we
are. Who may bid, how the bidding runs, how the bidding interacts with compensation, what nonprice factors are relevant to assignment decisions, and so on,
will need to be worked out over time. For now, we propose a basic framework for our auction mechanism,
and we outline a structure for constrained discretion
See supra Part II.B.
We discuss these possibilities in Part IV infra.
68 Thomas W. Malone, THE FUTURE OF WORK 103 (2004) (discussing the organization of internal markets).
66
67
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as part of the allocation process. Our specific focus is
the “examiner in charge”—the senior examiner who
leads the examination team at the bank. For large
banks, this senior examiner is a permanent fixture at
the bank. She supervises that single bank as her fulltime job. She has offices and support staff at the bank,
and she spends a fair part of her working life at the
bank.69
Section A describes a critical precondition to our
auction proposal—that examiners have skin in the
regulatory game by holding debt and equity securities
of the banks they regulate. Section B describes the
mechanics of our reverse auction. Section C elaborates
the advantages of our approach. Section D explains
the role of supervisors’ discretion in our examiner assignment scheme.
A.

Necessary Condition: Skin in the Game

A prerequisite to an auction system is that examiners have skin in the regulatory game. They must
enjoy some of the upside and suffer some of the downside of their good and bad regulatory decisions. Otherwise there will be little (social) gain or loss from their
assignment to any particular bank, and therefore no
valuable motivation behind the decision to bid for one
bank assignment or the other. Without bearing the
consequences from regulatory decisions, auctioning
could be perverse, since examiners’ bids would reflect
values personal to them that would diverge from social
welfare values from regulation. For instance, an examiner might prefer working with Bank A instead of Bank
B because the examiner thought Bank A was less work
to supervise, preferred the geographical location of
Bank A, enjoyed the people or coffee at Bank A more,
or any number of factors irrelevant to regulatory goals.
69 We discuss issues of examination team microstructure in
the next Part.
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If such personal values would spur an examiner to
outbid her competitors for the assignment, independent of the skill or fit of the examiner, then the result
could be worse regulation.70
Researchers have recognized the crucial role of
compensation schemes in determining players’ preferences in internal markets.71 In essence, the efficiency
of the market depends on the design of the internal incentive system. In an earlier paper, Pay for Regulator
Performance, we suggested a system of incentive pay
for bank examiners. Independent of work assignments,
but purely as an incentive device for conscientious
regulation, we argued that an examiner should be paid
in part with a debt-heavy portfolio of phantom debt
and equity securities of the bank she regulates.72
Holding periods for the portfolio would assure that the
examiner would embrace a medium- to long-term perspective in her regulatory decision making. For example, the examiner would not be shy about exposing excessively risky practices at her bank for fear of shortterm drops in the prices of the bank’s securities, since
any gains or losses would only be measured over a period of years. Instead, her decision making would consider the long-term interests of the bank, and indirect70 This assumes that social welfare impact of regulatory assignment is taken into account somewhat in a non-auction allocation system. If it isn’t, then the auction system without skin in
the game might be no worse.
71 Baiman, et al., supra note 57, at 916.
72 Because the trading price of public debt is sensitive to the
downside risk of its issuer, the debt portion of the examiner’s
portfolio would give the examiner a personal stake in curbing excessive risk taking at the bank. The smaller equity portion of the
portfolio would guard against excessive risk aversion by the examiner. Henderson & Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,” supra note __ at 138. The portfolio would only form a part of an examiner’s annual compensation, id. at 135; and it would use
“phantom” securities—essentially contractual rights to payment
based on the gains and losses of the underlying publicly traded
securities. Id. at 139.
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ly, the public interest. With an economic stake in the
eventual outcome of her regulatory decisions, the examiner would have an incentive to more actively and
carefully monitor the bank for which she is responsible.
With this as a starting point—that examiner pay
would vary with regulatory outcomes based on bankspecific debt-equity portfolios—our auction proposal
further capitalizes on these new incentives to improve
regulatory resource allocation. We use these bank
debt-equity portfolios as auction currency as well as
performance incentives, inducing each examiner to
value her potential regulatory assignments and thereby signal her individual skills, information, and preferences with respect to each assignment. The overall result, we hope, is the improved matching of regulators
to the regulated.
B.

Auctioning Off Supervision Rights

The central feature of our reverse auction proposal is that for a given bank, examiners would bid by
specifying the lowest-value package of that bank’s debt
and equity securities (the “auction portfolio”) they
would be willing to accept to supervise that bank. Supervisors would set the parameters of the initial auction portfolio before the auction—the debt-equity ratio
of the portfolio and its starting value, for instance—
and examiners would then bid by competitive discounting of this initial auction portfolio. Agencies
would conduct auctions for each regulated bank, specifying the composition and value of the initial auction
portfolio for each bank, as well as other auction rules.
Higher-ups might decide for a given bank that
the appropriate value for the initial auction portfolio
should be $100, with a debt-equity ratio of 3:1—$75 of
bank debt securities and $25 of bank equity at current
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market prices.73 These details might be based on experience with other similarly situated banks, the specific
details of this bank, the current economic times, or
other factors. Whatever the basis, an examiner especially confident in her ability to add regulatory value to
that bank would be willing to take a larger discount on
the proposed $100 initial auction portfolio than other
regulators because she would be better able to enhance the value of the portfolio than others. Her low
bid would signal this potential for regulatory value
added, and she should be assigned to supervise that
bank.
Competitive discounting from the initial auction
portfolio could take two forms. Examiners could either
bid with real dollars (“cash bidding”), or they could bid
by stating the minimum percentage of the initial auction portfolio they would accept to supervise the bank
(“portfolio bidding”). With cash bidding, each examiner
essentially offers to purchase the regulatory assignment, with 100 percent of the initial auction portfolio
as her incentive pay package. With portfolio bidding,
the winning bidder would win the assignment by accepting the smallest percentage of the initial auction
portfolio as her incentive pay.
In either case, the bidding would demonstrate
examiners’ relative confidence in adding value to the
bank through effective regulation, with the winning bid
exhibiting the most promise. For instance, if a bidding
examiner believed on this portfolio that her marginal
regulatory contribution would be to raise the value of
the firm’s debt by $25 over the course of her assignment, then she would be willing to bid up to $125 in
cash for the $100 portfolio of the bank’s phantom capital structure. This is because the examiner would ex73 Our proposal for performance pay is to pay regulators with
equity in the bank holding company, for reasons discussed in
Henderson & Tung, “Pay for Regulator Performance,” supra note
__ at __.
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pect the value of the portfolio to be at least $125 at the
end of the period. This examiner would win out over
an examiner who thought that his marginal contribution was anything less than $25.
It is difficult to tell in the abstract whether portfolio or cash bidding would be superior or whether
there is a general answer to the question of which is
the better approach. Each approach has benefits and
costs, and these are unlikely to be constant over time,
across regulators, or across banks. But it may be
worthwhile to sketch out potential advantages and
disadvantages of the different approaches.
Portfolio bidding has one distinct advantage over
cash bidding: it may avoid direct wealth effects, since
it does not require examiners to pay out of pocket to
bid. With a winning bid, the examiner simply agrees to
take less than 100% of the initial auction portfolio as
her incentive pay package. On the other hand, bidding
is capped because no examiner could discount the
portfolio by more than 100 percent. A potential drawback is that heavy discounting in the bidding process
may leave the winning bidder with too small a portfolio
to offer sufficient incentive for diligent regulation.
There may be good reason therefore to cap the bidding
at less than 100 percent.74
The pluses and minuses of cash bidding are just
the mirror image of portfolio bidding. With cash bidding, the magnitude of the performance incentives
built into the initial auction portfolio would not be diminished, since the winning bidder takes the regulatory assignment with the initial auction portfolio intact,
undiscounted. However, because examiners would
have to pay out of pocket to bid, the varying wealth of
74 Tiebreaking rules would be required. A number of rules
could be imagined, such as ties going to incumbent examiners, or
agency heads could decide. On general issue of tiebreakers, see
Adam M. Samaha, "On Law’s Tiebreakers," 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1661 (2010).
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individual examiners might affect auction outcomes.
Since examiner wealth is unlikely to be relevant to the
efficiency of the regulatory allocation decision, large
wealth effects might corrupt the allocation process.
One potential solution is to put an upper bound
on the cash bidding. If the dollar values involved in an
auction are small, then wealth effects are likely to be
correspondingly small. But the tighter the range of
bidding, the lower would be the potential for differentiation among examiners and the less expected turnover
in assignments. Moreover, arbitrarily capping the bid
amounts would create difficult choices when two or
more examiners are willing to pay the maximum
amount. With too low a cap, supervisors are left with
the allocation problem they started with.75
A final consideration is the possibility of perverse bidding. As more fully discussed in the next Part,
an examiner may pursue assignment to a specific
bank for private motives unrelated to adding regulatory value to the bank.76 For example, she may bid with
an eye to the revolving door, wishing to enhance her
prospects for future employment with a specific

75 Another way to ameliorate wealth effects is with borrowing. In theory, if an examiner could demonstrate that her supervisory assignment to a particular bank were a valuable asset, lenders should be willing to finance the acquisition of the asset. However, credit markets may not work effectively in this situation.
Besides valuation issues, the asset acquired with the loan proceeds must be capable of being collateralized. An examiner might
have a difficult time demonstrating the source of potential value
to a prospective lender. Information about the regulated bank, the
regulatory options, and so forth may be confidential and highly
sensitive. In fact, the regulator may be forbidden from disclosing
to anyone, especially to other banks. This scenario may also create a conflict of interest: one bank lends based on the ability of
examiners to better supervise another bank. Finally, if the examiner defaulted on the loan, the lender would not be able to liquidate the asset to satisfy the debt.
76 See infra Part IV.B.
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bank.77 Cash bidding deters perverse bidding, while
portfolio bidding may exacerbate it. Cash bidding
would effect a penalty by demanding both a high cash
bid in order to win the assignment, and then saddling
the examiner with the full amount of the initial auction
portfolio, with the attendant risk of large losses for lax
regulation. With portfolio bidding, on the other hand,
the perverse bidder would be willing to offer a high
discount on the initial auction portfolio, because it
both improves her chances of winning the assignment
and reduces the potential losses from lax regulation.
We discuss ways to deter perverse bidding in the next
Part. To the extent it remains a problem, cash bidding
would be superior to portfolio bidding, all other things
being equal.
Whether bids take the form of cash or portfolio
discounts, the auction would encourage research by
examiners into the quality of the assets they are bidding for. We leave it to the regulatory agencies to determine the optimal auction process. Higher-ups are
likely to have valuable information about specific
banks, about the need for particular compensation
strategies for specific banks or types of banks, experience with a range of compensation practices, and so
on. This expertise should be brought to bear in designing the auction process.
C.

Improved Matching

In this Section we explain the mechanics of the
improved examiner matching that is the central aim of
our proposal.

77 See id. Other perverse bidding motivations include insider
trading motivations and a desire for leisure. Id.
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1.

Signaling Information and Skill

Examiners may have ex ante preferences as to
which bank they will oversee. They may have varying
degrees of knowledge or expertise with respect to different banks. They may have different tastes for risk or
other factors. Insofar as these factors vary across examiners in valuable ways from a regulatory perspective, then an auction system can help increase regulatory efficiency.78 For example, an examiner’s special
expertise, experience, skill, personality, information, or
risk preferences may enable her to be especially effective at regulating a particular bank. She may possess
bank-specific information about business methods,
management, value, risk, regulatory needs, receptiveness to regulatory oversight, and so on. To the extent
her particular attributes would add regulatory value to
a given bank, this should motivate her to bid aggressively for that bank, since she would share in the value she adds to the bank through her conscientious
supervision. She would bid more for that bank assignment than for other available assignments, and
she would bid more for that assignment than her competitors would.
Bidding can help reveal examiners’ bank-specific
information or skills or preferences and sort examiners
accordingly.79 If well designed, the auction process can
help align bank- and examiner-specific attributes to
By contrast, if each examiner was equally qualified for each
regulatory assignment and stood to gain or lose the same, then
the auction would be of no value, since it would not reveal anything other than auction skill or perhaps risk preferences in auctions of the various examiners.
79 To generalize, this feature means the auction system is likely to work only when there is some specific linkage between the
work done and firm-specific values. For instance, it is unlikely to
work well for the regulation of clean air, but it might for patent
regulation, where there may be direct measures of social gains
and losses from patent decisions.
78
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promote desired regulatory outcomes. Consider two
different scenarios where the auction approach may
prove useful. In the first, call it “information forcing,”
Examiner 1 may bid for the supervisory assignment of
Bank A or Bank B. She believes strongly that Bank A
is more likely to default than Bank B, even in the face
of strong regulatory oversight. Based on this private
information, Examiner 1 might be less willing to supervise Bank A, since she would bear some of the consequences from bank failure. Accordingly, Examiner 1
would not bid aggressively to supervise Bank A, and
therefore the “price” to the agency of procuring supervision for Bank A would rise relative to Bank B.
In the second scenario, call it “skill matching,”
Examiner 2 is more confident of her ability to supervise Bank A and reduce its risk of default than Examiner 1. This could be because Examiner 2 believes she
has better skill or better information than Examiner 1,
or is less susceptible to capture, for example. Whatever
the case, the auction would help incorporate these factors into the allocation process. Examiner 2 would be
willing to make a lower bid than Examiner 1 to supervise Bank A, because she would capture more upside
from her regulatory choices in that supervisory role.
In both cases, the price signal provides valuable
information about examiners and banks. If there is
reason to believe that the information generated by
agency heads using a fiat model of allocation is insufficient to optimize the matching process, then an auction system may improve the process. Agency heads
could be biased by personalities or politics; or they
might have weak incentives to invest in the optimal
matching because of their own compensation system
or the weakness of reputational constraints. Examiners too might not have incentives to convey information about skill, fit, or risk tolerance to higher ups,
since there is little to gain from improved matching.
They also might be unable to do so effectively, since
the information might be costly to convey, either be-
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cause of the biases of higher ups or the complexity of
the information itself.
2.

Countering Incumbent Bias

Another advantage of using our portfolio-based
price mechanism to assign examiners to banks is that
it may help to counter the bias of incumbent examiners by facilitating their replacement.
Imagine an examiner who has worked on site for
a particular bank for several years, but now has to bid
on assignments every year or every few years. That examiner will likely have a significant edge over other examiners in bidding, given her likely informational advantages.80 But if examiners enjoy the upside and bear
the downside from their regulatory choices, then another examiner may be able to offer a lower bid if the
current examiner were biased by familiarity or captured in some other way.
For instance, assume that Bank A has a 30 percent chance of default, but incumbent Examiner 1 underestimates the risk (believing, say, there is only a 10
percent chance) and thinks there is little she can do to
reduce that risk. Examiner 2, in contrast, accurately
estimates the chance of default, and believes he can
reduce the risk to less than 10 percent. Because examiner pay is tied to the value of Bank A’s debt (and equity) under our compensation scheme, Examiner 2 can
expect to gain more than Examiner 1 in this situation
from the price appreciation in Bank A’s debt. Accordingly, Examiner 2 should be able to win the assignment. Examiner 2 would likely be willing to accept a
lower-value (ex ante) portfolio of the bank’s debt and
equity securities than Examiner 1, provided Examiner
2 sees clearly the prospective gain in debt value from
80 Of course, this advantage should be likely no more than the
status quo, which, for lack of a better phrase, biases in favor of
the status quo.
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reduced risk at Bank A. Incumbent Examiner 1's bias,
on the other hand, enables her to see only a smaller
gain. She would therefore be less willing to accept an
ex ante lower-value portfolio. In this way, the low bidder is likely to be the regulator best able to identify
and implement gains from regulatory action.81
Note that this debiasing effect of our regulatory
auction augments the debiasing work already being
accomplished with our incentive pay structure. The
debt-heavy portfolio of bank securities already helps
debias incumbent Examiner 1 directly because the
trading price of a bank’s debt securities reflects risk
taking at the bank. If Examiner 1 privately underestimates the risk of default of Bank A, the debt trading
prices of Bank A should offer some corrective. Also the
debt-heavy mix means that Examiner 1 has less to
gain from permitting the Bank to pursue risky strategies than the CEO does. But these incentives might be
insufficient if Examiner 1 does not have good information about risk or potential regulatory fixes, or is
incapable of processing the information accurately. As
noted above, this could be because of various biases
that arise from working at a particular bank. The assignment auction offers an additional mechanism to
address incumbent bias.
D.

The Role of Discretion

We do not view auction outcomes as necessarily
the dispositive factor in regulatory assignments. Auctions would reveal information to supervisors that
would be valuable in pursuing optimal resource allocaNote the crucial role of the debt-equity portfolio in the reverse auction mechanics. If the loss to either examiner from Bank
A’s default were simply a flat loss of $100, then incumbent Examiner 1 could be expected to make the lower bid, since Examiner 1
would have an expected value of default of minus $10, while Examiner 2’s expected value of default would be minus $30. This
would merely reinforce any bias from incumbency.
81
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tion. At the same time, supervisors will also have their
own valuable information and experience to bring to
the assignment process. Some discretion is therefore
appropriate. In terms of building discretion into our
auction-based assignment process, the existing government procurement process offers a useful example.
1.

Negotiated Procurement

In conventional government contracting, negotiated procurement is preferable to sealed bidding when
it may be necessary to conduct discussions with bidders or assignments may turn on non-price considerations.82 Examiner assignment seems analogous. Given
the familiarity among examiners and their supervisors,
it would seem odd to rely solely on examiner bids with
no further communication relating to assignments.
Similarly, given supervisors’ knowledge and experience
with their examiners, non-price considerations might
plausibly be part of the assignment process.
Because a more discretionary approach may
lead to undesired favoritism, existing procurement
regulations include a number of safeguards, some
form of which may also be suitable for examiner assignments. Negotiated procurement proceeds in stages
that are transparent to all the bidders.83 The initial
Request for Proposals (RFP) explains the agency’s
need, the anticipated terms and conditions of the contract, information that the bidder must include in a
proposal, and the factors that will be used to evaluate
the proposals and award the contract. The contracting
officer evaluates bids based not only on price, but also
on each bidder’s past contract performance and its
82 The extensive rules for government auctions, known as
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), can be fond here:
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/pdf/FAR.pdf.
83 For example, excluded bidders are notified of their exclusion. See id.
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proposed technical approach to the project at issue.
She then identifies the best proposals for further discussion.
“Discussion” is hardly a casual affair in negotiated procurement.84 Instead, it is subject to a number
of regulatory constraints to assure it is not used to favor one bidder over another.85 The stated purpose of
discussion is to maximize the best value for the government, and toward that end, to give bidders an opportunity to revise their bids to be more competitive.
Discussion must be “meaningful.” The agency “shall . .
. indicate to . . . each offeror still being considered for
award, significant weaknesses, deficiencies, and other
aspects of its proposal . . . that could, in the opinion of
the contracting officer, be altered or explained to enhance materially the proposal’s potential for award.”86
84

As the Federal Acquisition Regulation explains:

Negotiations are exchanges, in either a competitive or sole
source environment, between the Government and offerors,
that are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to
revise its proposal. These negotiations may include bargaining. Bargaining includes persuasion, alteration of assumptions and positions, give-and-take, and may apply to price,
schedule, technical requirements, type of contract, or other
terms of a proposed contract. When negotiations are conducted in a competitive acquisition, they take place after establishment of the competitive range and are called discussions.
See id.
85 The contracting officer may not (1) engage in conduct that
favors one offeror over another; (2) reveal an offeror’s technical
solution; (3) reveal an offeror’s price without permission; (4) disclose the names of persons providing information about the offeror’s past performance; or (5) furnish sensitive source selection
information. See FAR § 15.306(e).
86 See id. While each bidder’s pricing information is confidential, the agency can inform a bidder that its offer is too high or too
low and explain how the agency came to that conclusion. The
agency may also inform all bidders that it has determined a particular price to be reasonable, and the basis for that analysis.
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Following discussions, each bidder may submit a final
revised offer.
Finally, once the winning bid is selected, the
contracting officer must document the decision, analyzing the trade-offs accomplished by the discussions
and identifying the reasons why the winning bid was
the most advantageous to the agency.87
2.

Application to Examiner Assignment

A similar transparent negotiation process could
work for examiner assignments as well.88 Along with
setting each bank’s initial auction portfolio, supervisors could generate a written description of the specific
features of each regulatory assignment, including the
nature of the bank’s lending and other activities, the
appropriate type and level of experience for examinerbidders, the expected size of the examination team
that would supervise the bank, and so on. After culling
the most promising bids, supervisors could engage in
discussion with bidders in order to assist each bidder
in making her most competitive bid. As with outside
procurement, documentation of the choice of examiner
for each bank would operate as an important check on
favoritism and also make clear the agency’s priorities
with respect to examiner assignments.
Government procurement may not be the perfect
model for examiner assignment auctions, since procurement involves pure outsourcing. Examiners and
their supervisors likely have far better information
about each other and the bank supervisory assignments at issue than contracting officers and outside
See id.
We are not suggesting this process is perfect. There are
many criticisms of government procurement, and the process has
evolved over time in response to experience and learning. An auction system for regulatory assignments should take account of
these lessons and adapt them to the particular context.
87
88
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bidders have about each other or the work up for bid.
So a more streamlined process for examiner assignments may be appropriate. Also given bank confidentiality issues, transparency of the assignment process
should not extend to the public at large without procedures in place to address this concern. However,
transparency within the regulatory agencies would still
be important for assuring fair and impartial assignments. Familiarity among supervisors and examiners
might otherwise breed favoritism, and the entire point
of the auction process would be frustrated.
Although we think the experience with government procurement suggests a role for the discretionary
consideration of non-price factors in examiner assignment auctions, this increases the risk that factors unrelated to regulatory efficiency could be introduced.
There is no a priori way to address this issue. Agencies
will need to be sensitive to it as they implement an
auction system. Given the uncertainties, we suggest a
series of small-scale experiments, perhaps running
simulations or starting with just a few banks and a few
top examiners. The learning from these preliminary
trials could be used to develop a broader auction system.
Finally, banks come in all shapes, sizes, and levels of importance from a regulatory perspective. Accordingly, different auction mechanisms may be appropriate depending on a particular bank’s characteristics. Large, important banks, known as systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs), might warrant
a much different and more complicated auction process than local community banks. A risk-based auction design system might also make some sense.
IV. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
This Part offers some qualifications and addresses potential objections to our proposal. As we
have noted elsewhere, we are confident that there are
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many more details to be worked out by agency heads
and others within the regulatory agencies. Our goal is
merely to address the most significant potential obstacles in order to show that our auction approach is
worth serious consideration.
A.

Biases in Bidding and Beyond

Though we earlier detailed certain biases that
could impede effective fiat decision making within organizational hierarchies, auctions are not free of bias
either. Our move to a market mechanism simply
moves potential bias or decision-making problems
from the boss to the employee—from the decider (in a
fiat model) to the bidder (in a market model). For example, a bidder may be overly confident about her
ability or fit, such that her winning bid may be too low.
Her mistaken self-assessment may thus result in
suboptimal assignments.89
Studies of actual internal prediction markets
identify potential biases that might also affect our assignment auction.90 Google’s internal prediction markets show evidence of optimism bias among those employees trading: traded contracts tied to optimistic
89 Note that this bias of a single bidder would likely affect a
number of matches, and not just the biased bidder’s assignment.
90 Though internal prediction markets are different in important respects from our regulatory resource allocation auction,
there may still be useful lessons in analyzing the performance of
these prediction markets. Internal prediction markets are typically structured as continuous double-blind auctions, like spot markets. Our auction, by contrast, would occur only periodically;
there would be no continuous trading of regulatory assignments.
Also prediction markets typically trade contracts whose ultimate
payoff is not affected by the behavior of the bidders. Our auction
by contrast is designed to induce certain behavior by a winning
bidder by having the payoffs from her contract vary with her regulatory performance. We keep these differences in mind as we attempt to translate findings from internal prediction market studies to our auction context.
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outcomes were overpriced by ten percentage points.91
Newer Google employees were the most susceptible,
overbidding in reaction to upward trends in Google’s
stock price; employees with more experience on the job
and more trading experience were less susceptible to
this bias.92
One can easily imagine a similar bias affecting
examiner assignment auctions. An inexperienced examiner might overestimate both her abilities and the
possibilities for value-increasing regulatory changes at
particular banks. These misestimations would cause
the examiner to underbid, perhaps allowing her to win
an assignment but one that might not be an optimal
match.
Prediction markets also exhibit the long-shot bias, overpricing extremely unlikely outcomes.93 Again,
one could imagine an examiner—especially a less experienced one—overvaluing the bleak turnaround prospects for a shaky bank and therefore underbidding to
win the assignment.
Having staked her claim to a particular regulatory assignment through aggressive bidding, an examiner may compound her biases in her approach to supervision. Say, for example, that an examiner wins an
assignment through a bidding strategy based on her
overly optimistic pre-auction assessment of the potential for value-increasing regulatory changes at a given
bank. Having won the assignment, the examiner may
feel committed to that view of the bank, which may affect her regulatory choices going forward. Now invested
in her value-increasing regulatory strategy—which
might involve more or less aggressive oversight—she
may credit information that affirms her earlier assessment, but she may reject disconfirming information. This phenomenon of escalating commitment is
91
92
93

Cowgill, Wolfers & Zitzewitz at 1.
See id. at __.
Wolfers & Zitzewitz at 117.
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well understood by social psychologists and organizational behaviorists.94 Though it could plausibly affect
examiners even under the current system—examiners
commit to regulatory strategies regardless of the assignment mechanism—it may be especially worrisome
in the auction context, where the examiner has essentially made a financial investment in her regulatory assignment through a competitive process. The auction
might cause her to make a stronger and earlier commitment to her regulatory strategy than she would under the status quo.
Regulatory agencies and other buyers of labor
have ways to reduce these problems, however, as a
rich auction design literature describes,95 and as existing internal market arrangements illustrate.96 That
these problems are known is a first step toward ameliorating their costs. Biases can be identified from the
data and monitored, and auctions and other features
of work can be adjusted to reduce them. For instance,
by keeping data about bidding and performance, higher-ups can identify any systematic pathologies of the
bidding process, and tweak the auction design to remedy them. Moreover, the agency could rely on its own
information to help make corrections. For instance, if
agency heads (who would otherwise have allocative authority) have information suggesting flaws in particular
bids, there is no reason for them to ignore this information. Government contracting operates this way.
Outsourced functions do not necessarily go to the lowSee Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a
Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577 (1981).
95 See, e.g., PAUL KLEMPERER, ED. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
AUCTIONS (1999); PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2004); VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY (2002); J. Riley & W.
Samuelson, “Optimal auctions,” 71 AM. ECON. REV. 381 (1981); P.
Milgrom and R. Weber, "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive
Bidding," 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982).
96 See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz & M. Todd Henderson, supra
note __ at __.
94
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est bidder, especially if there is evidence of error in the
bid – say, it is way too low given the available information about the bidder. Viewed this way, internal
auctions are merely a way of broadening the range of
potential outcomes that would be made by a fiat system.
In any event, the potential problem is unlikely to
be systematic: after the overconfident employee realizes losses on the project she underbid, she is less likely
to persist in the biased belief that caused the errant
bid.
B.

Perverse Bidding Motivations

So far, the only bidding motivation we have considered is the examiner’s potential to add regulatory
value to banks. If pay-for-performance algorithms are
well designed (that is, effective at identifying the public
interest and inducing examiners to pursue it), and examiners are motivated to maximize their payouts under the algorithms, then a well-designed auction can
help elicit private information about regulatory efficiency. But an auction might also give examiners opportunities to pursue interests other than the public
interest.
In this Section, we discuss possible harmful motivations for bidding, and we offer some ideas about
mitigation. An examiner might bid for an assignment
to enhance her prospects for future employment with
her regulated bank; to enhance her income by trading
on inside information about her supervised bank; or to
accrue other benefits, such as leisure from supervising
a low-risk bank. Or examiners might collude to avoid
having to compete for assignments.
Each of these problems is endemic to any system of regulatory resource allocation; it does not originate with our auction proposal. The potential to manipulate regulation to serve private interests is already
a serious concern. By eliciting additional information
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from examiners (individually and as a group) on the
potential costs and benefits of various regulatory assignments, our auction proposal can supplement existing mechanisms that deal with these issues.
1.

Bidding for the Revolving Door

The revolving door may offer a significant source
of future income for an examiner. A particular bank,
for example, may develop a reputation for its generosity to its bank examiners with respect to postgovernment employment opportunities. With assignment auctions, a bank might even actively encourage
this perception in order to attract friendly examiners.
In this scenario, the bank essentially perverts the auction process, utilizing it to screen for lenient examiners.
Even absent opportunistic plotting by banks,
situations may arise in which potential revolving-door
benefits swamp any regulatory value that examiners
could add to banks through conscientious and innovative regulation. One can imagine, even absent any manipulation of the process, that the revolving door problem gets worse the longer an examiner supervises the
same bank. The bankers get to know the examiner and
vice versa; familiarity leads to implicit or explicit promises of quid pro quos (future employment for current
lax oversight). At some point, the examiner’s desire to
protect her investment in her revolving-door future
may trump other considerations, such that her winning bid may bear no relation to her ability to add regulatory value. Her revolving-door exit may be worth
more to her than any other examiner’s ability to add
regulatory value to the bank. These revolving door effects offer a new flavor of race-to-the-bottom regulatory
competition.
There are ways of reducing these problems,
however. Most obviously, examiners’ incentive pay
should provide a natural corrective. If the examiner
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bears the consequences of her own lax regulation,
then the aggregate costs of her revolving door bidding
strategy would increase. The downside of quid pro quo
laxity is currently very low; performance pay increases
the downside, while regular bidding for assignments
subjects this perverse bidding strategy to continuing
external constraint.
Systematically beating the system through revolving-door bidding strikes us as unlikely and, in any
event, relatively easy for higher-up regulators to detect
and address. Should revolving-door problems increase,
the variable pay component could be increased, vesting periods could be lengthened, or auction factors
changed.
Supervisors could exercise their discretion in the
assignment process even more finely. Auctions can
bring new information to examiner rotation decisions,
for example and facilitate tailoring by individual bank
or examiner. Under the current system of mandatory
rotation, a five-year “term limit” with any given bank
reduces examiner entrenchment (and thus capture).97
But trade offs between entrenchment on the one hand
and expertise and experience on the other might call
for shortening of the assignment term in the case of a
specific bank-examiner pair. For example, scrutiny of
an incumbent examiner’s string of consecutive winning bids for the same bank assignment over several
years might offer clues about her bidding motivations.
If her winning bids appear “irrational,”—i.e., she seems
to be losing money every year overbidding for her favorite assignment—then something might be amiss.
Perhaps her bids make sense only when the value of
her revolving-door exit is included in the calculus.98

See supra note __.
Other less sinister explanations are also possible. Perhaps
the incumbent values leisure extremely highly, and each year her
increasing experience and familiarity with the operations of a safe
97
98

(continued next page)
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Term limit intervention might be appropriate to that
individual case.
Less direct interventions are also possible. Auction bidding could be structured to produce higher
turnover rates if desired. For example, a bounty could
be paid for outbidding an incumbent examiner for an
assignment. This might be necessary to offset the costs
of overcoming the incumbent’s information advantages
with respect to the particular bank. A bounty amount
could be set such that, adjusted by the probability of
the non-incumbent’s winning of the assignment, it
would offset the non-incumbent’s investigation costs.99
Bounty levels could be fine-tuned to reflect increasing
incumbency advantages expected over time. Informational asymmetries will be lower for incumbents with
only one year at a bank compared with five years, for
example. Bounty levels to induce optimal research incentives should be adjusted accordingly.
More stringent constraints on post-government
employment could also help. A simple reform would be
to ban examiners from ever working for banks that
they have regulated. Another option, either as a compliment or a substitute to a bank-specific ban, would
be to require a waiting period before an examiner is
permitted to work for any bank. The delay would reduce the present value of revolving door rewards and
therefore deter the revolving-door problem on the margin. Reducing revolving door rewards, however—
through any of the mechanisms described here—may
may require agencies to increase examiner compensation to attract the same talent, since such constraints
would reduce the overall payoff from being a regulator.
bank assure her a relatively uneventful assignment with her favored bank.
99 For instance, if an examiner gets $10,000 for winning a new
assignment, and an examiner believes she has a 20% chance of
doing so for a particular bank, she would rationally devote up to
$2000 in resources to develop her bid.
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But again, this issue is not specific to auctions as an
assignment mechanism. Revolving door problems exist
regardless of the assignment method; they are inherent in any regulatory environment.
Auctions offer a number of promising approaches to addressing entrenchment, and with a term limit
in place, auctions should do no worse than the current
assignment system, and may likely do better.
2.

Bidding for Inside Information

Because examiners have access to private information about the banks they supervise, an auction
system for regulatory assignments coupled with compensation in the form of bank securities may offer
temptations toward insider trading or other misuse of
nonpublic information.
Though portfolio compensation under our proposal would be in the form of phantom securities that
could not be sold in securities markets, examiners given specific stakes in the market movements of their
banks’ securities might find other ways to profit from
inside information. They might simply leak nonpublic
information at opportune times in anticipation of cashing out a tranche of phantom securities. Or they might
sell information to others who trade. But, as with the
revolving-door problem noted above, this is not a problem specific to allocation mechanisms. In addition,
work rules already exist to constrain this type of garden-variety insider trading. To the extent that our use
of phantom securities may marginally exacerbate this
problem, agencies may wish to augment their preventive efforts or increase the penalties for violations.100

100 For instance, examiners paid in part in phantom securities
might pay more attention to bank stock and debt prices than they
do now. This saliency might then tempt them to engage in insider
trading of actual bank securities.
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Auctioning off work assignments offers additional nefarious possibilities. Various types of sophisticated investors might desire inside information about a
particular bank. Besides those looking for a trading
advantage, potential acquirers or targets of the bank
or parties involved in other major transactions with
the bank may seek nonpublic information about the
bank. These parties might be willing to finance an examiner’s bid for supervisory rights over the given bank
in order to gain access to information. Although some
version of this may be possible already—third parties
could try to influence examiner appointments or simply approach existing examiners—auctions may offer a
more direct and less easily detected method of influencing examiner assignments for shady purposes.
To some extent, a negotiated bidding process
could deter this species of perverse bidding.101 Not only do supervisors already know senior examiners personally, they could test the bona fides of examiner bids
during the negotiation process. In addition, higher ups
could more closely monitor newly auction-assigned examiners ex post for evidence of illicit motives inimical
to improved regulatory outcomes. Existing sanctions
for revealing confidential bank information could be
increased. Whether the additional costs of this monitoring and enforcement outweigh the benefits from
more efficient matching of examiners with banks is an
empirical question which only experience can settle.
We see no apriori reason to expect that these auctionrelated costs should necessarily swamp the benefits.
3.

Bidding for Other Private Values

Another species of private value is what me
might broadly call “leisure.” Certain regulatory assignments might be viewed as easier or cushier than
others. If true, we would expect these to attract exam101

See supra Part III.D.
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iners with a preference for leisure or other characteristics of a particular bank. Although this might seem
like an odd factor for regulatory higher ups to consider
in allocating resources, there are good reasons why
they should. Assuming examiners have heterogeneous
preferences for leisure or various types of risk, allowing examiners to price these preferences should improve regulatory outcomes. Harder working, riskpreferring examiners will be more likely to win assignments where those preferences will be valued, while
more easy going, risk-averse examiners will sort to
banks where those attributes are valued. It is important to reiterate here the work that compensation
contracts do, since examiners of all sorts will bear the
downside risks of their work. So long as this is true,
then sorting should be more or less efficient. Unless
these preferences can be transmitted efficiently in a
bureaucratic structure that allocates talent by fiat,
auctions will improve the efficiency of assignments by
creating a market for talent allocation.
An analogy can be found in the market for corporate executives. Executive compensation contracts
more or less reward executives for performance. The
result is that risk-preferring executives should tend to
work for high-risk companies, like technology start
ups or other volatile companies, while risk-averse executives should take jobs at utilities or other regulated
industries with greater opportunities to satisfy preferences for leisure or other non-monetary forms of utility. This helps ensure a match of talent with needs.
4.

Collusive Bidding

Examiners are likely to know at least some of
their fellow examiners quite well, and will be familiar
with their backgrounds, experience, professional
strengths, and personal preferences. This environment
of familiarity may facilitate tacit or explicit collusion in
bidding. Besides simply knowing one another, examin-
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ers can expect to be repeat players in the periodic assignment auctions. Simple game theory tells us that
these repeat plays facilitate cooperation by offering
players opportunities to reward each other for past cooperation or punishing one other for defecting from
prior understandings.102 For example, examiners might
agree among themselves as to bank assignments, but
then offer token auction bidding to camouflage the
conspiracy. In the absence of competitive bidding, examiners as a group would likely do better overall than
if they competed for assignments.103
Of course, the wider is the conspiracy, the more
difficult it is to coordinate ex ante or enforce ex post.
So an ambitious collusion scheme would likely fall of
its own weight. And a conspiracy involving just a few
examiners would likely be ineffective at altering auction outcomes. Moreover, collusion is also possible
when regulatory resources are allocated by fiat. Depending on the size and probability of obtaining favors
from the regulated, the stakes may be just as high.
Supervisors would have several possible strategies to fight collusion. These can be found in the policies and procedures of the Antitrust Division at the
Department of Justice, which polices commercial markets for anti-competitive behavior. Banking regulators
could offer rewards for whistleblowers, conduct random audits of bidding processes, impose large penalties (e.g., from termination to civil and criminal penalties) for those caught colluding, and so on. The specific
approaches to policing our examiner assignment aucFor a general discussion of the problems and potential
cures for collusion in auctions, see Yoram Bachrach, et al., “A
Cooperative Approach to Collusion in Auctions,” 10 ACM SIGECOM
EXCHANGES 17 (2011).
103 A mismatch of examiners to banks would mean worse performance of banks’ debt-equity portfolios overall, but each examiner’s portfolio would be larger without competitive bidding. Assuming the latter dynamic dominated the former, then examiners
as a group would benefit from collusion.
102
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tion are best left to the agencies and the experts at the
DOJ. A key point is that the potential for collusive behavior is likely no worse than in many commercial
markets, where the potential for collusion is insufficient to recommend fiat allocation of the resources at
issue.
C.

Examination Team Microstructure

For simplicity, our proposal focuses on the examiner in charge, but for larger banks, the examination process involves a team of examiners working under the examiner in charge. For these examination
teams, assignment decisions at the level below the
head examiner may matter a great deal, since the examiner in charge will have an imperfect ability to motivate and monitor examiners working on the team. Examiner teams are undoubtedly greater than the sum of
their parts. Examiners on a team need to work together, sometimes in high-pressure situations, so intangible factors—“chemistry”—will matter a great deal.
A simple but naïve approach would be to just extend our incentive compensation scheme and our allocation approach down the hierarchy. That is, senior
and junior examiners could all be independently assigned to bank teams through the auction mechanism.
But given the importance of team chemistry, this approach would be less than ideal. The examiner in
charge may reasonably expect some input into the
composition of her team.
There are better alternatives. Examination teams
without a lead examiner could be assigned by fiat by
agency higher ups, and then potential examiners in
charge could bid for a particular bank/examination
team combination. The pre-auction team assignments
could be made by experience, fit, random draw, or a
mix of factors, just as they are today.
Alternatively, lower-level examiners could bid for
assignments after examiners-in-charge had been as-
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signed to banks. So the lower-level examiners would
be bidding for lead examiner/bank combinations. And
examiners in charge and/or regulatory higher-ups
could exercise some discretion in tailoring teams,
based in part on these auction results. However assigned, the approach would ideally incentivize individual examiners and generate suitable matches without
impeding the lead examiner’s ability to manage the examination team.
Numerous mixed strategies could be employed
on an experimental basis to determine the optimal approach. For example, some teams could be assigned
independent of the lead examiners, some could be
chosen after a lead-examiner auction, and so on. We
do not have special wisdom on which of these strategies would be most successful at producing highquality examination teams. We are confident that efficient and effective strategies may emerge with judicious experimentation.
D.

Why It Has Not Happened Yet

If this is such a sensible idea, one might ask,
why has it never been tried? One possible explanation
relates to a precondition we described earlier: bidders
must have skin in the game.104 An auction system can
work only if examiners bear the costs and capture the
gains from the regulatory assignments they are bidding on. Since they are not currently paid for performance, this may explain the lack of experimentation
with market-based allocation mechanisms. Without
some skin the game for examiners, bidding for regulatory assignments would not be useful and could be
counterproductive.
Skin in the game does not necessarily have to
involve direct financial rewards, however. Insofar as
examiners and other regulators gain or lose reputation
104

See supra Part III.A.
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as a result of their performance, an auction could capitalize on this reputational stake and improve regulatory assignments. The absence of such experimentation
may therefore indicate the low intensity of these nonmonetary incentives or other factors. For instance,
agency heads may not have sufficiently strong reputational incentives to pursue optimal regulation. Or
agency heads may also be risk averse. A failed auction
system may cost them a great deal in terms of employee relations, their political fortunes, or other reputational factors. Even if a successful reform offered
symmetrical rewards, such rewards would have to be
discounted by the ex ante likelihood of failure. More
generally, any social gains would be widely dispersed.
In short, incentives to innovate may be lacking.
E.

Thinking Beyond the Agency

Assuming these various potential pitfalls can be
overcome, it becomes possible to imagine expanding
the auction beyond existing examiners within a particular federal agency and the banks supervised by that
agency.105 One can envision a broader assignment
auction to encompass banks and bank examiners
across the various federal bank regulatory agencies.
This could improve regulation because thicker markets
generally promote better matching. More banks and
examiners in the auction pool allow for finer tailoring
of examiner skill and experience to bank supervisory
needs.106
Though one might initially see historical assignment patterns replicated in the auction process
The OCC supervises national banks; the Federal Reserve
supervises state member banks and bank holding companies;
and the FDIC supervises state nonmember banks and FDICinsured savings banks. FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 24
(2000).
106 See ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012).
105
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across multiple agencies, one could imagine that over
time, individual examiners might develop expertise relating to banks not traditionally within their agencies’
purview in order to take advantage of the broader
range of regulatory assignments available.
The next incremental expansion of the regulatory assigment market might even include other financial regulators within the federal government or within
the broader range of quasi-public regulators, such as
the various self-regulatory organizations, or even further to new potential regulatory startups. For instance,
examiners at Finra,107 which regulates broker-dealers,
could bid for bank examination work if Finra and its
examiners believed that Finra examiners (of brokerdealers) could do a better job than current banking
examiners.108
As the pool of potential regulatory bidders were
expanded this way, we would expect the outsourcing
agency to impose bidding requirements. Sensible requirements would include minimum amounts of training or experience, bonding, or other rules designed to
reduce expected decision and error costs. These requirements should be considered carefully, however,
since they could be used to distort auction outcomes
to favor incumbent examiners.
FINRA is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
In fact, as of this writing, Finra is lobbying Congress to
give it regulatory authority over “investment advisors” under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Instead of any Congressional
mandate, the job could be put out to bid. Insofar as Finra, or any
other bidder, could be assured of bearing the upside and downside of its regulatory choices, then this might be a better way of
allocating the assignment. Although ensuring internalization of
costs and benefits may be more difficult for a regulatory agency
than for individual examiners, it is based on something like this
assumption that Finra, as a privately owned company, is currently permitted to regulate broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
107
108
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On the other hand, there may be good reasons
to bias the auction-assignment process in favor of existing agency examiners. For one, including extraagency examiners in the bidders’ pool would increase
the cost of using the price mechanism compared with
fiat. In addition, the broader is the range of individuals
or entities engaged in the bidding, the greater is the
potential for errors. This cost is reduced if the optimal
compensation contract can be written, causing the
parties to fully internalize the costs of their decisions.
We would expect that the more refined the compensation contract for examiner services becomes over time,
the lower the costs of expanding the range of potential
examiners. In any event, incremental expansions could
be implemented as we describe, with each stage of expansion subject to evaluation of its new cost-benefit
calculus.
V. CONCLUSION
Regulatory agencies across the government currently deploy their vast resources based on a commandand-control model. Agency heads direct particular government employees to do particular work. While the
assignments are no doubt influenced by the input of
those who will do the work, as well as assessments by
their superiors, this process could be improved by creating a market in which assignments are allocated using the price mechanism. If regulators reap the benefits of good work and bear the costs of bad work, then
they can convey information about themselves, their fit
with particular assignments, and the quality of regulated entities more efficiently through a market than
they can by lobbying or jawboning agency heads.
In this paper, we propose auctions for the allocation
of bank examiners to particular banks. Building off
our earlier work proposing performance pay for bankers, we show how auctions can improve regulatory effi-
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ciency by improving the initial allocation of examiners
and combating capture and entrenchment.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor M. Todd Henderson
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
toddh@uchicago.edu
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